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The economic performance of the Philippines has lagged behind most other developing countries 
in Asia. Whereas the Philippine economy and its agriculture sector performed moderately well in 
the 1960s and 1970s, because of the early advent of the Green Revolution in rice and the world 
commodity boom, the country has had the lowest average growth rates in gross domestic 
product, gross value added in agriculture, and agricultural exports over the past two decades in 
South and Southeast Asia (Table 1). 
Past studies have argued that the country’s poor agricultural performance has been due 
largely to weaknesses in the policy and institutional frameworks governing the sector, and not so 
much to real domestic and external market factors (David 2003; Balisacan, Fuwa and Debuque 
2004). Government price and trade policies have distorted economic incentives, and the choice 
of policy instruments used have promoted rent seeking and raised the economic cost of 
government interventions. The lack of market infrastructure, underinvestment in agricultural 
research, distortions in land markets due to the agrarian reform program, and other weaknesses in 
governance have all contributed to the poor performance of the sector.  
The declining trend in tariff protection since the 1980s — through a series of unilateral 
tariff reform programs and multilateral and regional trade agreements — have been well-
documented (Manasan and Pineda 1999; Aldaba 2005a and 2005b; Pasadillo 2006). All ex-ante 
impact assessments of the welfare impacts of trade liberalization using computable general 
equilibrium models consistently report positive effects (Habito and Cororaton 2000; Cororaton 
2000; Clarete 1991). International studies, mostly using the GTAP model, likewise, show 
generally favorable results from trade reform. Yet after more than two decades of trade 
liberalization efforts, the country’s economic performance did not significantly improve: per 
capita income continued to stagnate, domestic employment opportunities remained low, and 
poverty reduction lagged behind most other Asian neighbors.    2
Although the country appears to have become more open — as evidenced by the 
substantial rise in the ratio of the traded value of imports and exports to gross domestic product 
(Table 2) — that increase was not accompanied by an equivalent growth of gross domestic 
product. The rise in those trade openness indicators was primarily achieved through the rapid 
export growth of semi-conductors and electronic components with very high import content and 
low value added ratios. The growth rate of food and agriculture exports continued to drop, and 
the country’s dependence on agricultural imports rose sharply (Table 2).
1  
There are several complex factors that might explain why the predicted impacts of trade 
liberalization have not been realized in the Philippines. One explanation, at least with respect to 
the agricultural sector, could be that the rate of trade liberalization as measured by the trends in 
average tariffs (typically used by both local and international analysts) do not accurately reflect 
the extent nor the direction of change in agricultural protection over the past several decades.   
The objectives of this study are to quantify the trends and patterns of agricultural 
distortions from the early 1960s to 2004, and to explain the reasons behind those changes over 
time. In the next section, the historical patterns of agricultural performance and structural change 
are briefly described. The second section examines the evolution of both economy-wide and 
agriculture-specific policies that have distorted price incentives in the sector. The estimated 
impact of these policies on agricultural incentives is presented in the third section. The fourth 
section analyzes the reasons behind the evolution of policy choices, including the role of 
multilateral and regional trade agreements in the changes observed in recent years. Finally, we 
draw out the prospects for national policy reform: likely versus desirable policy direction 
through to 2020, implications for the trend level of distortions to agricultural incentives and for 




Agricultural performance and structural change 
 
 
                                                 
1  Real wages did not decrease only because of the acceleration of labor migration abroad. Migration increased 
foreign exchange earnings, with remittances now accounting for at least 10% share of gross national product. 
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Despite the relatively slow growth of the Philippine economy, the usual structural transformation 
in the course of economic development has taken place. The contribution of agriculture to the 
gross domestic product declined somewhat slowly from 1960 (30 percent) to 1980 (24 percent), 
and more rapidly in recent years (to 14 percent by 2004). This was accompanied by a steady 
decrease in the share of the sector in total employment from 61 percent in 1960 to 37 percent in 
2000. The share has remained constant since then (Table 2).  
Unlike the rapid industrialization that characterized the nature of economic growth 
among the so-called Asian tigers, however, the share of industry in the Philippines – which 
increased from 31 percent in 1960 to 39 percent in 1980 – has fallen back to the low 30s by 
2004. Food manufacturing accounts for about 40 percent of the industrial sector, and half of this 
consists of light processing of rice and maize, sugar, coconut, livestock and poultry. Services 
have provided the highest contribution to gross domestic product and total employment. While 
growth in services was driven primarily by domestic demand for logistical support, trading and 
financial services, the rapid expansion of business process outsourcing in recent years is 
changing the nature and prospects for growth of this sector. 
 
Growth rate and composition 
 
The average annual growth rates of gross value added by major agricultural commodities were 
quite erratic over time. The crop sector grew rapidly prior to 1980, due to the Green Revolution 
in rice and the world commodity boom, but it performed poorly after that: the average growth 
rate was far below that of the population. This marked slowdown can be observed generally 
across commodities (Table 3).  
Rice is the the main staple and the single most important crop in the Philippines. Whilst 
the growth rate of rice declined since 1970, it grew faster than population. It continues to receive 
the bulk of public expenditure for the crop sector, and it has also benefited from increasing price 
protection (see later). Imports of rice as a proportion of total supply have risen since the 1980s, 
reflecting the effect of increasing incomes and a shift away from maize as a food staple. Maize 
production experienced declining growth rates in spite of a rapid expansion of demand for maize 
as feed for the pigmeat and poultry industries, and despite rising price protection. 
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The poorest performers are the traditional export crops—coconut, sugar, abaca, and 
tobacco, each of which experienced a decreasing growth rate. By contrast, some non-traditional 
export crops — such as bananas, pineapples, and mangoes — experienced high growth rates. 
However, the crop diversification, particularly towards high-valued horticultural crops that raised 
the growth rates of the agricultural sector in Thailand, Chile and some other developing 
countries, was not so pronounced in the Philippine case. 
Growth rates of livestock accelerated after 1980, their contribution to gross value added 
(GVA) rising from 18 percent to nearly 25 percent within just 25 years. That remarkable 
performance was due to increasing domestic demand as well as to productivity gains from the 
shift to larger-scale operations and the adoption of new technologies embedded in imported 
breeds, veterinary medicines, and feed ingredients. 
 
Agricultural trade and trade openness 
 
Agriculture has historically been a net foreign exchange earner, contributing nearly two-thirds of 
total exports and accounting for only less than 20 percent of total imports in the 1960s (Table 2). 
The sector’s share in total exports dropped sharply to just 5 or 6 percent after the 1980s. By 
2004, the agricultural sector had ceased to be a net earner of foreign exchange, as agricultural 
imports rose from about 30 percent of agricultural exports in the 1960s and 1970s to nearly 140 
percent since the turn of the century. The relatively high growth rate of agricultural exports in the 
1970s was due mainly to the world commodity boom and the expansion of non-traditional 
commodities (bananas, pineapples and fishery products) – but world commodity prices fell 
sharply in the 1980s and continued to be low until recently. Further, the growth of non-
traditional agricultural exports leveled off by the 1990s. This is in stark contrast to the 
performance of neighboring countries, which experienced major export booms in cash crops 
even after the 1980s. For example, Thailand had  dramatic success in rubber, Malaysia in palm 
oil, and Indonesia in palm oil and cocoa. 
The composition of agricultural exports changed over the years in the Philippines. 
Coconut products continued to be the top foreign exchange earner, but its share decreased from 
nearly 70 percent of agricultural exports in 1970 to less than 30% in recent years. The 
contribution of sugar to agricultural exports, which was second only to coconut in the 1970s (30 
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percent), is now only 3 percent. The export value of bananas alone was about twice that of sugar; 
and this has been exceeded by exports of pineapples since the 1990s. Fruits and vegetables as a 
group now account for nearly 30 percent of agricultural exports.
2  
The rapid growth of agricultural imports stemmed from several factors. First, economic 
development increased demand for food products with higher income elasticities. Many of these 
products — such as wheat, milk and other dairy products, and beef — are commodities in which 
the Philippines does not have a comparative advantage. Second, livestock and poultry require 
agricultural inputs — soybean meal, maize, fishmeal and other feed ingredients — that are 
cheaper to import than to produce domestically. Third, agricultural modernization induced 
greater reliance on modern manufactured inputs that are mostly imported, such as fertilizers, 
agricultural chemicals, farm and agro-processing machinery, and veterinary medicines. Lastly, 
trade liberalization increased imports of previously highly protected agricultural commodities 
including fruits and beef. 
There has been an apparent decrease in agriculture’s trade openness as measured by 
imports plus exports as a percentage of gross value added (last row of Table 2). While 
agriculture was relatively more open than the rest of the economy up to the 1970s, the reverse 
has been true since then. This was due not so much to the reduction of imports to gross value 
added ratios (as these increased for both agriculture and non-agriculture sectors), but rather to 
decreasing export ratios for agriculture in contrast to the steadily rising trend for the rest of the 
economy. The declining trend in agriculture’s trade openness in the 1970s and 1980s gradually 
reversed in the 1990s; but the rate of increase in the import ratios continued to be higher than its 
export ratios. 
 
Comparative advantage and productivity trends 
 
The slower growth of Philippine agriculture compared to other developing Asian countries, and 
stagnation of agricultural exports, suggest that the country has been losing its former 
comparative advantage in the sector. Indeed, measures of revealed comparative advantage 
decreased sharply for agriculture as a whole, and for all major agricultural exports (Table 4). For 
                                                 
2Fishery products, led by tuna and shrimps, have become major agricultural exports contributing about 20 percent of 
total agricultural exports in recent years. 
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example, the country’s share of the world market in coconut products fell, and sugar began to be 
imported (as exports are limited to preferential access to the high-priced US market). Even for 
non-traditional exports, such as bananas and pineapples, the shares of Philippine products on 
world markets have declined since the mid-1980s. 
The apparent loss in comparative advantage in agriculture is consistent with the reported 
trends in labor and land productivity indicators (David 2003). Both labor and land productivities 
increased up to the late 1970s, particularly during the Green Revolution period in rice. Whereas 
labor productivity for agriculture as a whole recovered after dropping sharply in the early 1980s, 
labor productivity in the crop sub-sector stagnated since then. Land productivity for the crop sub-
sector grew slowly, particularly in the most recent period, with yields per hectare of traditional 
exports generally remaining constant or even declining. Higher growth in yields can be observed 
in rice, maize, and non-traditional exports such as bananas, pineapples and mangoes. Growth in 
productivity appears to have occurred in the livestock sector though, where international 
technology transfer, greater scale of operations, and other management-related innovations have 
increased production efficiencies significantly. 
 
 
Historical evolution of price intervention policies 
 
 
Before estimating rates of assistance it is helpful to first describe policy trends since the 1960s, 




An import substitution industrialization strategy dominated Philippine economic policies up to 
the late 1970s. The groundwork for this was laid by comprehensive foreign exchange and import 
controls that were instituted in response to the severe balance of payments crisis that occurred in 
the late 1940s, shortly after the country’s political independence from the United States. The 
government’s use of “essentiality” criteria in allocating foreign exchange and import licenses 
during the 1950s encouraged domestic production at the finishing stages of primarily 
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nonessential and semi-essential consumer goods, against backward integration for the production 
of raw materials, intermediate and capital goods. These policies defended an overvalued peso 
and thus clearly penalized exports and agriculture.  
A tariff system was instituted as a decontrol measure in 1957. The system, however, 
largely preserved the biases in the incentive structure: tariffs depended again on essentiality 
criteria. Import duties were higher for semi-finished products as compared to raw materials and 
capital goods, and even higher for finished products. Moreover, quantitative trade restrictions 
continued to exist for substantial number of agricultural and non-agricultural products. Indeed, 
the subsequent balance of payments problem encountered in the early 1960s rendered tariff 
protection redundant as import and foreign exchange controls were predominant. Adoption of a 
multiple exchange rate system further penalized traditional agricultural exports.  
In the early 1970s, a balance of payments crisis resulted in a major devaluation of the 
peso. By this time the high economic cost of the import substitution industrialization strategy and 
its detrimental effects on export potentials were being increasingly recognized. Nonetheless,  the 
policy response was to provide industrial incentives directly through tax holidays and the like to 
selected firms, including exporting enterprises (Bautista and Tecson 2003). No attempt was made 
to modify the highly protective tariff system. In fact, tariff protection was raised on many 
import-competing products such as primary and processed food and agricultural products, 
chemical products, metal manufactures, electrical appliances and machineries, and transport 
equipment. During this period, the Philippines had the highest average tariff rate in Southeast 
Asia (Intal and Power 1991). In addition, the number of imported products (based on 7-digit 
PSIC classification) subject to quantitative restrictions rose from 26 percent in 1970 to 52 
percent in 1980 (Bautista and Tecson 2003). 
In the early 1980s, the government adopted various structural adjustment and 
stabilization measures to correct fundamental distortions in economic incentives and imbalances 
in the external and public sector accounts. These measures included trade policy reforms to 
remove quantitative trade restrictions and reduce the level and dispersion of tariffs, and 
liberalization of the foreign exchange market. The first of the unilateral trade liberalization 
programs, called TRP 1, was instituted in 1981 as a condition for a World Bank structural 
adjustment loan package.  
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Under TRP 1, the dispersion of tariff rates was to be reduced by lowering the peak tariff 
rates of 100 percent and 70 percent to 50 percent in two stages, and the very low tariff rates 
raised to at least 10 percent by 1985. Overall, the average tariff dropped substantially from 43 
percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 1985. To complement the tariff reform program, import 
licensing was also to be gradually relaxed. From the original list of 1300 import items banned or 
requiring prior approval by the Central Bank and other government agencies, the plan was to 
remove these non-tariff barriers over three years — 264 items in 1981, another 610 in early 
1982, and the remainder by end of 1983 (Bautista and Tecson 2003).  
However, the balance of payments crisis of 1983, following Benigno Aquino’s 
assassination, stalled these initiatives. The government again adopted comprehensive import and 
foreign exchange controls, making tariff reductions ineffective. Commercial banks were required 
to turn over their foreign exchange receipts to the Central Bank so that priority imports and other 
payments could be made. A 5 percent general import tax was imposed in November 1983 to 
generate government revenues and discourage imports; and this increased to 8 percent in April 
1984 and then to 10 percent two months later. Additional export duties ranging from 2 to 5 
percent were levied on traditional export products from November 1983 to December 1984, and 
an economic stabilization tax of 30 percent was levied briefly on all exports in 1984. 
To curtail imports and capital outflows, the peso was devalued successively and in late 
1984 the exchange rate was allowed to float. Tax reforms during 1983-85 gradually unified sales 
taxes on imports and import substitutes, removing one source of import protection. The mark-up 
rate (which increases the tax base for imports) on essential and semi-essential goods was reduced 
to a uniform 25 percent in 1985, and removed altogether in 1986. 
Under the new government of Corazon Aquino, the trade liberalization program was 
revived in 1986. Export taxes on all commodities were abolished except for logs. The process of 
lifting import licensing was accelerated: 951 import items were liberalized in 1986, 170 in 1987, 
and another 209 products in 1988. Of the remaining 673 restricted import items, those on list A 
were scheduled for immediate liberalization and 94 of them were liberalized by the end of 1989, 
and those on list B were scheduled for further review. However, those on list C (numbering 114 
items) continued to be restricted, for national security or health reasons.  
The second unilateral tariff reform program (TRP II) was launched in July 1991 with the 
issuance of Executive Order 470. This EO was intended to reduce the range of tariff rates to 3 to 
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30 percent over a 5-year period. By the end of 1995, even though about 10 percent of the 
commodity lines were still subjected to tariffs outside the target range, the average tariff rate had 
declined from 33 percent in 1990 to 27 percent. 
As part of the TRP II, EO 8 was also issued that converted quantitative restrictions of 153 
agricultural products into their tariff equivalent rates and realigned tariffs on 48 commodities. 
But this was soon reversed based on the Magna Carta of the Small Farmers (RA7606) passed in 
1991, which provided, among other things, blanket authority for restricting agricultural imports 
competing with domestic production. 
It should be emphasized that the price and trade protection of most major import-
competing agricultural products were largely untouched by the series of unilateral trade 
liberalization efforts since the late 1980s. Even with the WTO and other regional trade 
agreements, a number of non-tariff trade barriers continue to distort prices of some of the most 
important of commodities. 
 
Agriculture-specific policies to the mid-1980s 
 
Although import tariffs are generally levied on all agricultural products and inputs, these are 
more commonly in effect only on agricultural inputs and agricultural products which are not 
locally produced in any significant quantity. Such products include milk, wheat and soybeans. 
Tariff protection is essentially redundant on exportable products that are competitive in world 
markets, and on non-traded commodities because of prohibitive transport and other marketing 
costs. 
Over the period under study, a wide variety of policy instruments that influence price 
incentives were applied to major agricultural commodities. These include government monopoly 
control on international trade and domestic marketing operations, import bans, quantitative trade 
restrictions, import licensing, export taxes, and export bans.
3 Furthermore, despite serious efforts 
at unilateral trade liberalization, some of these policy instruments applicable to the more 
important import-competing agricultural products were largely kept intact. Indeed, some of these 
                                                 
3 Even for relatively minor crops, specific laws were passed prohibiting imports of onion, garlic, potatoes, and 
cabbages (RA 1296) in 1955, coffee (RA2712) in 1960, and tobacco/cigarettes except for blending purposes 
(RA4155 and other PDs) in 1964. 
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interventions had a long history, starting in the Commonwealth period that began in 1935. Under 
the Marcos’ Martial Law era that began in late 1972, the government had considerably more 
leeway to intervene in prices and the marketing of agricultural products, and it did so. The 
following discussion, therefore, distinguishes the evolution of agricultural price intervention 
policies before and after 1986 when the Aquino government took over the reins of government. 
 
Rice and maize 
When bad weather caused a drastic shortfall of staple food grains in 1936, the National Rice and 
Corn Administration (NARIC) was established to ensure stable and low prices for consumers, 
and adequate price incentives for farmers. To achieve these conflicting objectives, NARIC was 
granted monopoly control over imports and exports of rice and maize, as well as budgetary 
support and a credit line to undertake domestic market operations to defend price floors and 
retail ceilings and narrow geographical and seasonal dispersion of prices. 
With the high world commodity prices in the early 1970s, government monopoly control 
over food commodities under this agency, which by then was renamed the National Food 
Authority (NFA), was expanded beyond rice and maize. This was to allow tariff-free 
importations of wheat, maize, soybeans, soybean meal, ruminant livestock and beef. 
 
Sugar 
The sugar industry has historically been the most highly assisted industry. This is due to 
preferential access to the US market (that began in 1902) and the authority given to the 
Philippine government to administer its sugar export quota to the US in 1934 through the Jones-
Costigan Act.  
Initially, the domestic quota system was established for the orderly distribution of the US 
quota among sugar producers. In the 1960s, this quota system was also designed to reduce the 
burden on domestic consumers of the higher export prices resulting from the 1962 devaluation 
and the greater US quota allocation arising from the Cuban crisis. Under this system —which has 
continued to the present— producers are paid a composite price derived as an average of the 
export price, a lower domestic wholesale price, and a reserve price weighted by the quantity 
allocations targeted for US exports, the domestic market, and as a reserve. 
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As the Laurel-Langley Agreement ended in 1974, sugar trading was effectively 
nationalized, first under the Philippine Exchange Inc. (PHILEX, Inc.) and subsequently under the 
National Sugar Trading Association (NASUTRA). The latter was the sole wholesale buyer and 
seller of sugar in both the domestic and international market until the end of the Marcos regime 
in early 1986. It also established new refineries, operated sugar centrals, and acquired leading 
enterprises involved in the transport, storage, and handling of sugar for export. 
 
Export commodities 
Except in the aftermath of the 1970 devaluation and the sharp increases in world commodity 
prices in the mid-1970s, there have been few attempts to intervene in the production and trade of 
exportable agricultural products. Initially as part of the stabilization measures, export taxes from 
4 to 6 percent were imposed on major agricultural and other primary exports, and continued to be 
in place until the mid-1980s for revenue generation. The higher rate of 6 percent was imposed on 
traditional exports of coconut (copra) and centrifugal sugar to promote new and greater 
processing of agricultural exports. The lower rate of 4 percent was applied to coconut oil, 
dessicated coconut and coconut cake and meal, molasses, abaca, bananas, and pineapple 
products.
4  
In 1974 with the world commodity boom, additional export premium duties were briefly 
imposed, ranging from 20 to 30 percent of the difference between the ruling export price and a 
February 1974 base price. Consequently, windfall gains from the devaluation and the commodity 
boom in the early seventies were partially siphoned off from the producers of these agricultural 
and primary exportable commodities. 
The Coconut Consumers’ Stabilization Fund further levied the coconut industry in 1973 
(commonly known as coco levy). This was partly to protect domestic consumers from a sharp 
rise in coconut oil prices on the world market, and partly to raise funds for the development of 
the coconut industry.
5 There was also the belief that taxing or restricting coconut exports could 
be beneficial as the Philippines was considered to have some monopoly power on the world 
                                                 
4 Export taxes were also imposed on logs at 10 percent, copper ore at 6 percent, and shrimps and prawns, lumber, 
plywood and veneer, and other metal ores at 4 percent. 
5 About 20 percent of the revenues from the tax briefly supported the direct subsidy on domestic consumption of 
coconut oil products. The remainder was supposed to finance development programs in the coconut industry such as 
replanting, vertical integration and scholarships. Later research showed that very little benefit, if any, accrued to 
farmers from these expenditures (Clarete and Roumasset 1990). 
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market. (While the Philippines accounted for a high share of total world coconut and coconut oil 
exports, any monopoly power was curtailed by the fact that coconut oil comprises only about 7 
percent of the world lauric oil market). Part of the revenue from this levy was used to buy out 80 
percent of the coconut oil milling industry and put it under the newly created, “privately owned” 
United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM). This eventually acted as a monopsonist buyer of 
coconut from the farm sector. As world prices of coconut oil fell in 1982, the levy was lifted – 
only to be replaced by a policy of banning coconut exports to protect coconut oil mills. 
 
Agriculture-specific policies after 1986 
 
By the late 1970s, world commodity prices began to fall. However, the policies and institutions 
established to cope with high world prices persisted, because they proved to be convenient 
means of raising revenues. Such measures ended up heavily taxing farmers to support private 
interests and bureaucratic inefficiencies (David 1983). It was not until 1986, under the new 




Export taxes, including the coconut export ban, were abolished, and the NFA’s monopolistic 
controls over international trade in wheat, soybeans, soybean meal and meats were removed, 
limiting NFA’s functions to rice and maize (as was the case prior to martial law). Its domestic 
marketing operations were also effectively reduced, because financial support had to come 
mostly from annual budgetary allocations rather than profits from importations.   
The NASUTRA was replaced by the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) which 
functioned primarily to regulate the market. It mainly allocated US sugar quotas, determined the 
allowable quantities of imports, the importers, the amounts to be sold in the domestic market, 
and the amount to be kept in reserve. It also performed developmental functions, such as 
research and extension, but it has ceased to engage in direct market operations.  
Quantitative trade restrictions on fertilizers were removed, and tariffs on major 
agricultural inputs lowered substantially. However, UNICOMs monopsonist’s control over the 
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coconut market has continued, as the government’s attempts to wrest ownership of this entity 
continue to be bogged down in court proceedings. 
In spite of trade liberalization efforts in the late 1980s, most major importable agricultural 
commodities with any significant domestic production remain subject to quantitative import 
restrictions (QRs), particularly those protected by laws passed by Congress. Efforts to remove 
QRs were pre-empted by the passage of the Magna Carta of the Small Farmers (RA 7606) in 
1991 which provided, among other things, blanket authority for restricting agricultural imports 
competing with domestic production. In addition, the Seed Law (RA 7308) was passed to 
regulate the import of seeds and planting materials. 
 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
The country’s ratification of the GATT/WTO Uruguay Round Agreement in 1995 promised to 
set a decisive path towards trade liberalization in agriculture. It aimed to replace all QRs with 
tariffs, impose a ceiling on tariff rates, and reduce tariff protection over time. Unfortunately, the 
specific agreements and the manner of implementation did not live up to the promise (David 
1994; David 2003). 
First of all, rice — one of the most heavily regulated commodities — was exempted from 
tariffication until 2004, similar to the case of Japan and South Korea.
6  
Second, the quantitative trade restrictions (QRs) lifted in April 1996 under EO 313 were 
replaced by tariff rate quotas which initially raised the out-of-quota tariffs to the maximum 
(bound) tariffs committed under the WTO, while the in-quota tariffs were set mostly at the levels 
existing in 1995. The initial out-of-quota tariffs of 100 percent were typically higher than the 
nominal protection rates implied by the QRs in 1990-94. These were also higher than the book 
tariff rates under the earlier EO 470 which programmed the unilateral tariff reductions of a wide 
range of agricultural and industrial goods. Despite the scheduled reductions in the out-of-quota 
tariffs by 2004, these are equal to or even higher than tariff rates back in 1995 under EO 470. 
These rates are definitely higher than the government’s target average tariff of 5 percent by the 
end of that period. 
Furthermore, where QRs of the primary and lightly processed products were to be lifted, 
tariffs were raised on a number of imported agricultural products considered to be close 
                                                 
6 The Philippines is still negotiating in the WTO’s Doha Round to keep government monopoly control over rice 
imports. 
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substitutes of commodities (e.g., feed wheat and barley, as substitutes for maize). Tariffs were 
also increased to the same level on the more heavily processed products using these commodities 
as the main raw materials (e.g., preserved and canned meat products, milled rice and maize, and 
roasted coffee).  
Third, the manner in which the minimum access volume (MAV) provision or the tariff 
rate quota system of the Agreement was administered for major import-competing commodities 
in effect simply perpetuated quantitative trade restrictions. The quantities that may be imported 
at the lower in-quota tariffs were sometimes changed to prevent domestic prices from rising 
sharply whenever production shortfalls occurred. Thus, tariffs were operationally no different 
from QRs. For certain commodities, the right to import was given mostly to domestic producers 
of the same products (e.g., pork and poultry) who often choose not to utilize their import 
allocation so as to protect their domestic production. Moreover, since most of the MAV volumes 
are lower than import demand at the in-quota tariff rate, and the rights to import the MAV 
volume were not auctioned, large quota rents accrued to those given access to the MAV 
allocation, at least in the early period of its implementation. 
Finally, the Agreement’s lack of provision regarding market operations of parastatals 
allowed the Sugar Regulatory Administration to continue exercising its regulatory functions with 
respect to import levels and market destinations of domestic sugar production. In fact, the 
domestic market operations of the NFA to support producer prices were expanded in the late 
1990s to include sugar.
7 
 
Regional trade agreements 
In 1992, the six original ASEAN member countries agreed to form the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). The aim of the area was to reduce tariffs to between 0 and 5 percent and to abolish 
quantitative trade restrictions and other non-tariff trade barriers by 2010. Under the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme, unprocessed agricultural products were commonly 
included in the Sensitive List (SL), and thus they start trade liberalization later (between 2001-
2003) and are required to achieve the 0 to 5 percent tariff targets by 2010. A recent study 
                                                 
7 The government also occasionally used the WTO sanctioned safeguard mechanism when additional tariffs were 
imposed on poultry. 
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indicated that thus far, the effective protection rates of agriculture are still largely unaffected by 
the CEPT (Pimentel 2006). 
Unlike other FTAs, which usually delay or totally exclude trade liberalization of 
agriculture, the China-AFTA Agreement signed in 2002 specifically covered a significant 
portion of agricultural products in the Early Harvest Program (EHP). It called for the elimination 
of tariffs on live animals, meat and edible meat offals, fish, dairy products, other animal 
products, live trees, vegetables, fruits and nuts, and a few commodities from other chapters of the 
HS. The changes were to start January 2004 and be in place no later than January 2006 for 
ASEAN6, although some exceptions were allowed depending upon negotiations with China. 
The Philippines signed its EHP with China in early 2006 and the agreement covered 
proportionately fewer commodities compared to other ASEAN countries, suggesting there is less 
interest in engaging with China in more open agricultural trade (Pasadilla 2006). Consumers, in 
general, will benefit from lower prices on covered commodities, while producers of exportable 
bananas, pineapples, mangoes and other tropical fruits, and coconut and coconut oil, are 
expected to gain from greater access to the vast Chinese market. Producers of vegetables, 
leguminous crops and pigmeat, together with producers of fruits for the local market, however, at 
least initially will be hurt by the entry from China of relatively cheap frozen meat and other meat 




Estimates of nominal and relative rates of assistance 
 
Measuring the distortions to incentives caused by price and trade policies has had a long history 
in the Philippines. The first effort was by John Power (1971) for 1965, which was followed by 
studies conducted by Norma Tan (1979) for 1974, Elizabeth Tan (1994) for the 1980s, Manasan 
and Pineda (1999) for the 1990s, and Aldaba (2005a,b) for recent years. These studies estimate 
the effective protection rates of all industries, both agricultural and non-agricultural. However, 
the main interest and analysis were concentrated on the manufacturing sector.  
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The first studies on agricultural protection were conducted by David (1983), Intal and 
Power (1991), and more recently David (2003). Unlike the industrial protection studies that 
quantified the effects of tariffs and indirect sales taxes, these agricultural protection studies were 
based on domestic and border price comparisons. This enabled the effects of non-tariff trade 
barriers to be measured and redundancy of tariffs, if any, to be taken into account. The indirect 
impacts of industrial protection and other economy-wide factors on agricultural incentives 




In this study, nominal rates of assistance to industries are estimated. The main focus of the 
present study’s methodology (Anderson et al. 2008) is on government-imposed distortions that 
create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under free markets. Since it is not 
possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, 
the project’s methodology not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy measures, 
but it also generates estimates of distortions in non-agricultural sectors for comparative 
evaluation. 
More specifically, this study computes a Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for 
producers of the main farm products, which are shown in Figure 1. It also generates an NRA for 
nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the calculation 
of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA – see Anderson et al. 2008). This provides a consistent 
time series annual measure of distortions over more than four decades using the value of 
production as weights to compute sectoral and sub-sectoral averages. This contrasts with 
previous studies which, except for Manasan and Pineda (1999), have computed sectoral averages 
using trade volume as weights.  
A small open economy is assumed so that the country’s trade level does not affect world 
prices.
8 Border prices are estimated based on world price series reported by the World Bank. For 
importables these are adjusted to c.i.f. values by assuming the cost of transport and insurance to 
                                                 
8 Only in coconut products is the country a significant trader, being the world’s largest producer and exporter for 
most of the period under study. However, coconut products are to a large extent substitutable with competing 
products such as palmoil and soybean oil. Coconut oil – the most important coconut product – constitutes only a 
small (7 percent) share of world trade in vegetable oils. 
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be a constant 20 percent of f.o.b. world prices. The country’s officially recorded import or export 
unit values were not chosen because foreign exchange controls, export taxes and other taxes 
mean export unit values are significantly undervalued, particularly in the period up to the mid-
1980s. For rice, maize, and sugar, either the import unit values may be overvalued (in the case of 
imports by NFA) or undervalued (as private importers seek to lower their tariff payments by 
under-invoicing). There were also many years when no imports were made for some importable 
products.  
Rice, maize, sugar, pigmeat, beef, and poultry are consistently classified as importables 
even though there were no imports in some years. In the case of sugar, imports started only in the 
1990s, but even in the 1960s and 1970s exports of sugar were confined to the high-priced United 
States market to which the Philippines had preferential access, and were not competitive at the 
free market world price. Sugar is thus also treated as an importable. 
In the absence of detailed time series data on marketing costs, the domestic price is 
defined as the wholesale price which is the closest to the same point in the marketing chain as the 
border price. 
For most of the agricultural commodities where domestic and border prices are 
compared, the commodity that is internationally traded is lightly processed rather then the 
primary product sold at the farm level: milled rice vs paddy, raw or refined sugar vs sugarcane, 
frozen pigmeat, beef, or poultry vs hog, cattle or chicken birds. In the case of sugar, the rates of 
protection received by farmers and millers are the same because the revenues derived from the 
sale of raw and refined sugar in both the domestic and United States markets is shared 
proportionately between the two in the ratio 70-30.
9  The ratio of the farm price of paddy to the 
retail price of rice did not significantly change, suggesting that farmers and rice millers together 
with traders share proportionately from the protection accorded the rice industry. For rice, maize, 
pigmeat, beef, and poultry, it is assumed that NRAs of the processed and farm products are 
                                                 
9According to Borrell et al. (1994), the quedan system, which allocates products produced to the various markets in 
fixed proportions, lowers incentives to increase production and invest in yield-increasing technology. This is 
because higher production reduces gross revenues. Also, because export allocation to the US is in a fixed ratio, there 
is no incentive to improve milling quality for export that will increase net returns. On the other hand, the sugar 
sharing arrangement (60 to 70 percent to growers and 30 to 40 percent to millers depending on the recovery rate) — 
instituted by law (RA 809) to provide millers a share of the benefits from the price protection — also reduces both 
growers’ and millers’ incentives to raise productivity. That is, growers receive only 60 to 70 percent of benefits from 
productivity-enhancing investments, while millers receive only 30 percent to 40 percent. 
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equivalent. In fact, import tariffs on these farm products are generally the same as their lightly 
processed variety.   
Aside from the major agricultural commodities specified above, NRAs are assumed for 
the other, non-covered crops within the sector. Since price comparisons are more difficult to 
perform for non-covered exportables— including pineapples, mangoes, abaca, and tobacco — 
their average NRA is assumed to be zero or equal to the export tax whenever it applied. For 
products that are non-traded because of prohibitive marketing costs, such as roots and tuber 
crops, zero NRA values are assigned.
10 For the many import-competing vegetables, other fruits, 
and other minor crops, their NRA as a group is assumed to be the same as the average for 
covered importable products.
11 We assume that the weights are one-third each for exportables, 
importables, and nontadables in the non-covered part of farm production (which in aggregate 
amounts to around one-fifth of the agricultural sector’s value of production at undistorted prices).   
For non-agricultural importable products, NRAs are generally based on book tariff 
rates,
12 apart from lightly processed food manufacturing industries — rice and maize milling, 
sugar milling and refinery, coconut oil production and refining, etc. — where the NRAs are 
based on price comparisons. For a number of non-agricultural primary industries in fishery, 
forestry, and mining, we use the export taxes that applied from 1970 to 1985. Definitions of a 
product’s tradability and industry weights used were the same as for agriculture. 
 
                                                 
10As prescribed in Anderson et al (2008), a commodity is considered non-tradable when the proportion of imports 
and exports to total value of production is less than 5 percent. When a commodity/or commodity group is both 
exported and imported in significant amounts (that is,  more than 2.5 percent of total value of output) the NRA is 
estimated as the average of the NRA of that commodity as an exportable and as an importable weighted by their 
respective proportions of export and import values to the total traded value. 
11 Despite the supposed removal of quantitative trade restrictions for all agricultural commodities except rice, non-
tariff barriers appear to be significant in many commodities, such as in vegetables, fruits, and meat. Price 
comparisons are difficult to perform on many of these products because of the lack of consistent world price series, 
difficulties in making adjustments for quality differences, and the complexity of measuring the impact of increased 
imports of a commodity that may not be grown in the country on the price of a highly substitutable product that is 
produced domestically. One clear indication, however, is the very substantial smuggling of vegetables and fruits and 
nuts from China. Reported exports of these commodities to the Philippines in the Chinese trade statistics have been 
up to ten times higher than recorded imports of these commodity groups in the Philippine official trade statistics, 
despite the already low tariffs on these smuggled products (mostly 3 percent, but with some up to 10 percent since 
the late 1990s).                   
12 From 1960 up to the early 1980s, differences in the indirect tax on domestically produced and imported products 
imposed during this period were added to tariffs in the computation of NRAs. While the tax rates were in most cases 
the same, it is effectively greater because the tax base for imports is the tariff-inclusive price augmented by a 
percentage mark-up. In 1974, the weighted average nominal tariff rate alone equaled 22 percent for manufacturing, 
but the nominal rate of protection increased significantly to 31 percent when the effect of the difference in tax base 
is included (Tan 1979). 
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NRAs for agriculture 
 
Estimates of the nominal rates of assistance of agricultural commodities from 1962 to 2004 are 
summarized in Table 5. Although the estimated NRAs are highly variable over time (see the 
annual estimates in Appendix Table A5), several general patterns emerge from the 5-year 
averages. 
First, import-competing industries have enjoyed much more assistance than exportables. 
Coconut production has been penalized by negative NRAs over the entire period of the study, 
averaging around -20 to -25 percent from the 1970s up to the mid-1980s. Apart from the multiple 
exchange rate policy prior to 1970 (not measured here), this was due to the imposition of several 
measures: the export tax, the coconut levy, and the coconut export ban to siphon off windfall 
gains from the 1970 devaluation; the subsequent world commodity boom of 1973-74 that was 
incompletely transmitted to the domestic market; and lower raw material costs for the coconut oil 
milling industry. Despite the abolition of these policy instruments in 1986, however, coconut 
farmers continued to be implicitly taxed, albeit at a lower rate of around 15 percent of border 
prices. Evidently, the government’s failure to dismantle the former UNICOM’s ownership of 70 
to 80 percent of the coconut oil milling industry up to the present time has allowed the 
continuation of its monopsonist’s power over coconut’s domestic prices. 
Second, among import competing commodities, the level of NRAs differed significantly 
and the differences widened between two groups of import-competing products over time: the 
NRAs for the most important commodities — rice, maize, and sugar — increased, while those 
for the minor but numerous and high-valued commodities declined. Each of these commodities is 
considered in more detail below. 
Third, the increasing level of NRA observed since the 1980s may be due in part to the 
government’s efforts to reduce the burden of adjustment of the agricultural sector to a secular 
long-term decline of world commodity prices. This declining trend is visible in real domestic 
prices compared to real world prices for several commodities in Appendix Figures A1 to A8. 
Fourth, the dispersion of NRAs among agricultural products within the farm sector (as 
measured by the standard deviation of those NRAs, reported near the bottom of Table 5) has not 
dimished over time. Nor has the trade bias index (Table 6), indicating that the NRA for 
importable farm products has persistently remained above that for exportables. Both of these 
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indicators imply that the efficiency of resource use within the farm sector has been substantially 
compromised by agricultural policies. 
And fifth, NRAs fluctuate from year to year (see Figure 2 and Appendix Table A5) 
mostly in response to world price changes and sometimes in response to exchange rate 
adjustments. For example, the NRA for import-competing agricultural products is below trend in 
the 1973-74 and 1980 years of high international prices, and above trend in the low-priced mid-
1980s period. This suggests that domestic price stabilization has been an important objective of 
agricultural price and trade policy. Table 7 indicates that the estimated coefficients of variation 
of domestic prices tended to be considerably lower than those of world prices, particularly for 
major import-competing commodities.  
 
Rice 
The trends in the nominal rate of assistance to rice reflected the NFA’s inability to 
simultaneously attain its inherently conflicting objectives of providing low prices to consumers 
and remunerative incentives to farmers. Prior to the late 1980s, the domestic price of rice was, on 
average, about equal to the long term level of the border price. The negative levels of protection 
from the 1970s to the early 1980s were due to unusually high world prices during this period. 
This did not discourage farmers though, as the Green Revolution and rice farming land reform 
were transforming tenants to owner-operators.
13  
With the drop in the world price of rice, a sharp fall in irrigation investments, and 
stagnation of the yield potential of newer modern varieties, growth in demand for rice increased 
faster than production from the late 1980s. The NRA for rice became positive and rose to about 
50 percent by the early 2000s. This is despite much higher imports than ever before, reflecting 
the country’s rising comparative disadvantage in rice production.  
 
Maize 
Maize is a food staple for about 10 to 15 percent of the population and a major feed ingredient 
for livestock. In contrast to rice, however, domestic production has been consistently protected, 
with the NRA steadily rising over time from about 25 percent in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
                                                 
13 In fact, the new seed-fertilizer technology and the accompanying irrigation expansion increased the country’s 
comparative advantage in rice production, briefly turning the country from being a net importer to being self-
sufficient and reducing the domestic price in real terms by the late 1970s. 
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up to nearly 80 percent by the late 1990s. Unlike rice, there is less political pressure to lower 
maize prices for poor consumers, because maize is mostly eaten as a subsistence crop among 
upland farmers in the southern part of the country.  
 
Sugar 
When sugar is categorized as an importable and the world price of sugar — and not the export 
unit value to the US premium market — is used as the border price in the calculation of the 
NRA, the domestic sugar industry is clearly the most highly protected industry throughout the 
period under study. US consumers paid a large part of the income transfer to the sector in the 
1960s and early 1970s when nearly all domestic production was exported. However, the burden 
shifted to Filipino consumers and food processors at the end of the Laurel-Langley Agreement in 
1974. At that time, the US sugar quota dropped sharply. Exports which continue to be confined 
to the protected United States market now account for only one-tenth of domestic production. 
Yet, because of import restrictions, the average nominal rate of assistance to the sugar industry 
has increased over time, and has averaged around 90 percent during the past decade.
14 
 
Poultry and other livestock 
Poultry producers received a high level of protection. A slightly increasing trend in the NRA is 
discernable over time: from about 40 percent prior to 1985, when the high tariff protection (70 
percent) was redundant to a significant extent, to about 50 percent in later years. 
The pigmeat industry had significant tariff protection, although generally it has been 
lower than poultry. After 1995, the government adopted the same level of high in- and out-of-
quota tariffs for both poultry and pigmeat under the WTO Agreement. However, the low tariff 
was largely redundant up to the 1980s, as were the relatively high tariffs after 1995.  
Tariff protection for beef was historically less than that for pigmeat: the NRA averaged  
around 10 percent until the late 1980s. Beef was not included among the sensitive products 
whose tariffs were raised in the aftermath of the WTO Agreement. Nonetheless, an upward trend 
in its estimated NRA can also be observed during the 1990s. It appears that the government’s 
attempt to promote cattle fattening activities, by allowing duty-free imports of young cattle 
                                                 
14 Even the large margins conferred on importers of sugar as a result of this high level of nominal protection have 
been mostly received by the sugar cane growers, who receive most of the rights to import dispensed by the Sugar 
Regulatory Authority.  
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imported from Australia, was accompanied by more restrictive non-tariff trade barriers on beef to 
increase incentives. The expansion of the cattle fattening business was short-lived, however, as 
tariffs on beef were reduced in the late 1990s and import restrictions became untenable.
15 The 
lower protection for  beef compared to the poultry industry may be explained by the prevalence 
of large-scale integrators producing poultry through contract farming, in contrast to the beef 
industry which is dominated by backyard producers. However, pigmeat is also dominated by 
backyard producers, and it had relatively high protection rates. 
 
Agricultural inputs 
To infer the effect of price intervention policies on value added, trends of the NRA on major 
intermediate inputs commonly used in agricultural production are reported in Appendix Table 
A1. Until the mid-1980s, the government’s industrial promotion policies significantly raised 
domestic prices of manufactured inputs to agriculture. The consumer tax equivalent of import 
protection on agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, farm machinery and 
even water pumps was generally higher than the NRAs for agricultural outputs, except for sugar 
in some years. With the exception of subsidies for gravity irrigation in rice, there was no 
significant offsetting input assistance to agriculture. Indeed, despite price controls, tax free 
importations, and direct subsidies to fertilizer companies in this early period, the consumer tax 
equivalent on farm inputs was negative only during 1970-1974 (due to the four-fold jump in 
world prices of oil). These are not incorporated in the aggregate NRA for crop agriculture but, if 
they had been in the manner described in Anderson et al. (2008), they would have lowered the 
estimated NRA for crops by a small number of percentage points, and more so in the earlier 
decades than in recent times. The estimated NRAs for livestock also would be lower if the 
impact on feedmix prices of import restrictions on maize were taken into account.  
 
NRA for non-agriculture and RRA for agriculture 
 
                                                 
15 During this period, imports of live cattle averaged more than 200,000 heads. This number has declined 
significantly as the cattle fattening business is now limited to the Del Monte and Monterey (San Miguel) companies 
which use by-products of their other business, i. e., pineapple canning and beer manufacturing, respectively, as their 
main feed ingredient. Earlier, live cattle were mostly imported for almost immediate slaughtering, and thus the 
government’s policy was promoting the slaughtering business, more than cattle production. 
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Agricultural incentives are also affected indirectly by rates of assistance to non-agriculture. 
Mobile resources move according to the relative incentives across sectors or industries. Figure 3 
and Table 7 show the trends in the average nominal rates of assistance of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, as well as the relative rate of assistance to agriculture. The contrast in 
the trends between the two sectors is quite striking. Whereas the average NRA for agriculture 
was lower than non-agriculture prior to the mid-1980s, it rose to an average of more than 30 
percent in the most recent decade or so. On the other hand, with the series of unilateral trade 
liberalization measures, the NRA for non-agriculture steadily declined from nearly 20 percent in 
the 1960s and 1970s to only 7 percent by the early 2000s. 
As a consequence, assistance to agriculture is now much higher than to non-agriculture, 
so the relative rate of assistance has gone from an average of around -15 percent prior to the mid-
1980s to an average of more than +20 percent in recent years. This trend indicates that the 
efficiency of resource use as between farming and production of non-agricultural tradables first 
increased as the RRA became less negative but then decreased as the RRA became increasingly 
more positive. That is, there were too few resources in the country’s agricultural sector up to the 




Explaining patterns of distortion to agricultural incentives  
 
 
In general, countries switched from taxing to subsidizing their agricultural sector in the course of 
economic development, primarily due to political economy factors (Anderson, Hayami and 
others 1986; Lindert 1991; Anderson 1995). In a country which would be self-sufficient in food 
in a world of free agricultural trade, that shift is expected to occur when its per capita income 
reaches 2.6 times the global average (Tyers and Anderson 1992). For a country that would be 
only 65 percent self-sufficient in food under free trade, the shift would occur when its per capita 
income reached the global average ($4300 in 1992). In the Philippine case, the shift from taxing 
to assisting agriculture directly through price interventions occurred at a lower level of economic 
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development than predicted by earlier studies, as per capita income in the Philippines was only 
about $1200 even by the late 1990s.  
Why did the switch towards higher agricultural protection occur early in the Philippines? 
The explanation lies in a set of unique historical events, political economy factors, the political 
system, and a strong nationalist sentiment for food self-sufficiency, especially in the case of rice. 
As discussed earlier, the highly skewed land ownership distribution and dualistic agrarian 
structure arising from the country’s colonial land policies and agro-ecological conditions meant 
there were large landowners and plantation operators who were able to effectively lobby for their 
vested interests. These farmers were historically the major political leaders at the helm of 
Congress and the national and local executive branches of the government. The landed oligarchs 
were also the business elite, who successfully pushed for an industrial protection policy that 
biased incentives against the agricultural sector (Hara 1994). But as the international pressure for 
trade liberalization mounted during the past two decades, it was easier to resist the opening of 
domestic markets for food staples by playing up the national sentiment for food self-sufficiency. 
Political pressure to raise agricultural protection was strengthened by the expanded lobby groups 
consisting of farmer organizations, large land owners, and agri-business firms such as livestock 
and poultry, millers, seed companies, and the input suppliers. 
There has been little resistance to high prices of white maize as food because it is 
primarily a subsistence crop. The livestock (including poultry) producers and feed millers who 
use mostly yellow maize have chosen to lobby more for higher livestock output protection to 
offset the high maize prices than for a more rational maize-livestock policy. Objections to the 
highly restrictive maize import policy have been addressed by providing import allocations at 
lower tariffs to the large, more organized, and vocal sector of the feed, poultry, and pigmeat 
industries. In addition, large feed mills and livestock producers also own flour mills, and are thus 
able to substitute low-grade wheat subject to only a 10 percent tariff for the artificially high-
priced maize. That policy structure provides the large-scale feed and livestock producers a cost 
advantage over the small ones who have to rely on the domestic market for their maize supplies. 
Aside from the large size of farms and mills, the sugar sector has historically had strong 
political power because of its close relationship and common interest with the government in 
lobbying for protecting the country’s preferential market access share of the US sugar market. In 
contrast, the share of sugar in direct household expenditure is very small and therefore 
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consumers have generally tolerated or been unaware of high sugar prices. Resistance from the 
food processing sector against high sugar prices was mitigated by granting larger, more vocal 






Price intervention policies became more favorable from the mid-1980s in the Philippines 
agricultural sector. Protection of major import-competing commodities was increased and a 
series of unilateral trade liberalizations lowered implicit tariffs on inputs and the protection of the 
non-agricultural sector. Thus, improvements in agricultural incentives occurred at the cost of 
inefficiencies in resource allocation arising from widening distortions in prices within 
agriculture, and between agriculture and non-agriculture. 
Artificially raising the profitability of major import-competing commodities directly 
increased the cost of land for other crop production. As well, it indirectly reduced the 
competitive advantage of exportable agricultural products in world markets. The high maize 
price policy also lowered the international competitiveness of the pigmeat industry, in which the 
Philippines may well have a comparative advantage. The very high protection for sugar hurts not 
only consumers but also the food processing industry, which accounts for over 20 percent of 
value added and employment in manufacturing. Excessively high protection for major staple 
food commodities reduces the welfare of rural landless and urban poor households and puts 
pressure on wages, making labor-intensive manufacturing industries less competitive relative to 
the low wage, cheap food economies such as Vietnam and China. 
The economic waste caused by price intervention policies is magnified by the continued 
use of quantitative trade restrictions instead of tariffs. In particular, the government’s monopoly 
on rice imports and domestic marketing operations through the NFA not only have been 
extremely costly but also have failed to achieve the basic conflicting objectives of lowering food 
prices to consumers, raising producer prices, and stabilizing both sets of prices. Use of 
quantitative restrictions promote rent-seeking, reduces government revenue, incurs significant 
bureaucratic costs, and worsens price uncertainties.  
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Unfortunately, recent policy changes in response to the WTO agreement seem to have 
exacerbated, rather than mitigated, such problems: nominal protection rates for major import-
competing commodities were not only raised, but the scope of NFA operations was inadvertently 
expanded. Rice market interventions and the use of quantitative restrictions have persisted 
because the economic costs, and even some of the financial costs, are not readily apparent to the 
general public. Meanwhile, the bureaucracy is corrupted through commissions, bribes, and other 
rents typically involved in government procurement and import licensing, making it even more 
difficult to effect trade liberalization. 
There are no indications that the Philippine government will move towards greater trade  
 
liberalization in agriculture in the near future. In the current negotiations under the Doha Round,  
 
efforts are being made to retain the relatively high level of tariff protection on the major import- 
 
competing agricultural commodities. Furthermore, the government is not taking any step to dis- 
 
mantle the institutions and other policy instruments that regulate the imports of rice, sugar, and  
 
other commodities. With the sharp rise in world grain prices in recent years, the government will 
 
all the more be politically compelled to continue with the food self-sufficiency strategy, rather 
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Figure 1: Value shares of primary production of covered and non-covered products, Philippines, 
1966 to 2004   
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all
 covered 











































































































Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
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Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to all agricultural and nonagricultural tradable industries 
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Table 1: Average growth rates of gross domestic product, gross value added in agriculture, 
       and agriculture exports, the Philippines and other selected Asian countries, 1960 to 2004 
(percent) 
 
  1960 - 1980    1980 - 2004 
              
  GDP  Ag GVA  Ag Exports    GDP  Ag GVA  Ag Exports 
                      
             
Philippines  5.3   4.1   12.0     2.7   2.0   1.6  
              
Indonesia  7.9*  4.6*  11.6     5.4   2.9   7.2  
              
Malaysia  7.2   4.8*  12.7     6.6   2.2   5.7  
              
Thailand  7.5   4.8   13.5     6.0   2.7   6.7  
              
India  3.6   2.2   9.0     5.4   3.4   5.8  
              
Pakistan  5.8   3.6   14.2     4.7   3.7   7.2  
              
Bangladesh  2.6   1.6   3.1     4.3   2.7   1.3  
              
China  5.5   4.3   15.0     9.5   4.2   6.6  
              
Vietnam  -  -  -    6.6   3.7**  18.2  
                      
              
a  Growth rates estimated by regression.             
*  Refers to 1970-1980.               
** Refers to 1985-2004.                 
Sources of basic data : World Development Indicator (WDI) World Bank; FAOSTAT   
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Table 2: Changing structure and trade openness of the Philippine economy, 1960 to 2004  
(percent) 
 
    1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2004 
        
Agriculture's  share  in:        
          
  GDP  30 28 24 22 20 14 
          
  Employment  61 52 48 45 37 37 
          
  Imports  19  14 8 10 9 8
a 
          
  Exports  64 44 35 15  5  6 
          
Trade openness indicators:             
          
  Ag  imports/GVA  6 10 9 13  22  26
a 
    [9]  [16] [23] [27] [45] [51] 
          
  Ag  exports/GVA  33 44 26 14 15 19 
    [9]  [15] [17] [19] [51] [46] 
          
  Ag imports & exports/GVA  38  54  35  28  37  45 
   [18]  [36]  [43] [48] [96] [97] 
          
a When agricultural inputs are included, the ratio of agricultural imports to gross value added in 
agriculture is significantly higher, reaching 39 percent in 2004. The ratio of agricultural inputs to 
total imports based on that broader definition is 11 percent in 2004. 
   
Note:  Figures in square brackets refer to trade openness for the whole economy. 
          
Sources of basic data: National Statistical Coordination Board; Bureau of Labor and Employment 
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Table 3: Growth rates of gross value added of major agricultural commodities, Philippines, 1960 to 2004 
  
(at constant 1985 prices, percent) 
 
  
1960-70  1970-80  1980-90  1990 - 2004 
          
Crops 4.3  6.2  1.1  1.9 
          
 Rice  -  4.3  2.9  3.6 
          
 Maize  -  5.2  3.1  1.9 
          
 Coconut
a  - 7.8  -3.9  1.1 
          
 Sugar  -  5.2  -1.8  4.1 
          
 Banana  -  13.9  -1.8  4.0 
          
 Other  crops  -  8.1  2.2  0.8 
          
Livestock and poultry  3.1  3.1  5.7  4.4 
          
 Livestock  -  0.8  4.8  3.5 
          
 Poultry  -  8.5  7.5  5.7 
                 
 
a Throughout the word coconut is used to also cover the main farm product known as copra. 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation using basic data from the National Statistical Coordination Board 





Table 4: Revealed comparative advantage
a of major agricultural commodities, Philippines, 1960 to 2004 
   
    1960 1970 1980 1990  2000  2004   
                
  All agriculture
b  3.0 2.6 2.9 1.6  0.6  0.8    
                
  Coconut  116 145 224 212 71  97     
                
 Sugar
c 18  21  12  4  1  1     
                
 Banana  -  -  3  23  11  14    
                
  Pineapple              
     Canned  -  -  82  70  27  29     
     Fresh  -  -  49  55  10  8     
                
 
a  Estimated as the ratio of the share of a commodity group in a country's exports to that 
commodity group's share in world exports. Except for 1960 and 2004, all are 3-year averages 
centered at year shown.        
b  Includes  fisheries.               
c  Note that sugar has been historically exported to the US typically at a preferential price (i.e., higher 
than world prices). Hence a value greater than unity in this case does not reveal comparative advantage. 
However, the sharp declining trend may still be interpreted as a rapid deterioration in comparative 
advantage.    
Source of basic data: FAOSTAT               




   1962-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79  1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
    
Exportables 
a  -9.0 -7.6 -14.3 -14.6 -22.6 -16.5 -11.4 -5.4 -8.7 
Coconut -24.4 -20.2 -25.3 -16.7  -27.1 -20.6 -15.3 -7.8 -14.1 
Banana 0.0 0.0 -4.0 -4.0  -4.0 -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
           
Import-competing products 
a  -1.1 17.4 -5.6 -5.8 2.2 30.2 25.1 48.1 31.4 
Rice -3.4 -1.4 -9.7 -17.9  -16.3 14.5 20.9 52.7 50.7 
Maize 0.5 38.4 14.0 24.3  20.1 59.8 62.6 78.5 54.5 
Sugar -8.2 120.7 -11.7 -1.7  59.5 123.2 49.3 97.2 79.3 
Beef 15.0 15.0 12.0 10.0  5.0 17.0 28.0 28.0 10.0 
Pigs -30.0 13.6 3.2 -5.5  35.8 51.0 25.1 20.6 -8.3 
Chicken 8.9 67.1 28.9 28.1  38.4 42.9 56.5 42.2 52.1 
    
           
Total of covered products 
a  -1.9 15.3 -6.5 -8.1 -5.1 16.1 17.5 37.9 24.9 
Dispersion of covered products 
b 17.1 29.6 25.2 22.3  28.6 29.9 27.5 27.9 30.4 
% coverage (at undistorted prices) 78 79 79 74  73 73 77 77 80 
 
a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
2
 




   1962-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79  1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered products 
a -1.9 15.3 -6.5 -8.1  -5.1 16.1 17.5 37.9 24.9 
Non-covered products   -0.4 5.8 -2.3 -2.4  0.3 10.0 8.4 16.0 12.3 
All agricultural products 
a -1.6 13.3 -5.6 -6.6  -3.6 14.4 15.4 33.0 26.0 
Non-product specific (NPS) assistance  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS) 
b  -1.6 13.3 -5.6 -6.6 -3.6 14.4 15.4 33.0 26.0 
Trade bias index 
c -0.03 -0.18 0.04 -0.03  -0.15 -0.31 -0.26 -0.34 -0.31 
    
Assistance to just tradables:    
   All agricultural tradables  -1.7 14.3 -6.0 -7.2  -4.0 15.8 16.7 35.7 27.9 
   All non-agricultural tradables  19.0 20.3 16.3 16.3  12.9 11.0 9.9 8.6 7.3 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA 
d  -17.4 -5.0 -19.8 -20.3 -14.9 4.3 6.1 24.9 19.1 
 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies. 
b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors 
and intermediate inputs divided to total value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (%). 
c Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for 
the import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
  
Table 7: Coefficient of variation of real international and Philippine 
wholesale prices of major agricultural commodities, 1960 to 2004 
       .     
    1960 - 2004  1960 - 1980  1980 - 2004 
       
Rice     
  World 47 32 34 
  Domestic  19 12 11 
       
Maize     
  World 38 17 27 
  Domestic  23 17 14 
       
Coconut     
  World 49 27 40 
  Domestic  45 31 36 
       
Coconut  oil     
  World 50 27 43 
  Domestic  43 32 33 
       
Sugar     
  World 80 71 60 
  Domestic  19 14 18 
       
Beef     
  World 33 21 23 
  Domestic  28 35 17 
       
Pigmeat       
  EUV  Sing  46 44 23 
           Domestic  13  12  14 
       
Poultry       
  EUV  Sing  37 33 14 
  Domestic  29 17 15 
       
 
Source: Estimates based on data in authors’ spreadsheet 
 Appendix Figure A1: Trends in (a) nominal rates of assistance and import tariffs, (b) domestic 
wholesale price, border price and exchange rate, and (c) indices of real domestic wholesale and 
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Apendix Figure A2: Trends in (a) nominal rates of assistance and import tariffs, (b) domestic 
wholesale price, border price and exchange rate, and (c) indices of real domestic wholesale and 
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Appendix Figure A3: Trends in (a) nominal rates of assistance and import tariffs, (b) domestic 
wholesale price, border price and exchange rate, and (c) indices of real domestic wholesale and 
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Appendix Figure A4: Trends in (a) nominal rates of assistance and import tariffs, (b) domestic 
wholesale price, border price and exchange rate, and (c) indices of real domestic wholesale and 
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Appendix Figure A5: Trends in (a) nominal rates of assistance and import tariffs, (b) domestic 
wholesale price, border price and exchange rate, and (c) indices of real domestic wholesale and 
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Appendix Figure A6: Trends in (a) nominal rates of assistance and import tariffs, (b) domestic 
wholesale price, border price and exchange rate, and (c) indices of real domestic wholesale and 
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Appendix Figure A7: Trends in (a) nominal rates of assistance and import tariffs, (b) domestic 
wholesale price, border price and exchange rate, and (c) indices of real domestic wholesale and 
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Appendix Figure A8: Trends in (a) nominal rates of assistance and import tariffs, (b) domestic 
wholesale price, border price and exchange rate, and (c) indices of real domestic wholesale and 
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Appendix Figure A9: Trends in the official exchange rate (OER), real effective exchange rate 
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Appendix Table A1: Distribution of gross value added in agriculture by major commodities at current 
and constant prices, Philippines, 1960 to 2004  
(percent) 
        
    1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2004 
          
Crops  69 77 82 74 73 70 
    (77) (79) (83) (75) (69) (68) 
         
 Rice  -  17 16 21 21 20 
    -  (23) (20) (22) (23) (24) 
          
 Maize  - 6 7 9 6 7 
    -  (9)  (8) (10) (7)  (8) 
          
 Coconut  - 13  11  7 5 5 
    - (13)  (12)  (6) (4) (5) 
          
 Sugar  - 8 6 4 3 3 
    -  (7) (5) (3) (3) (4) 
          
  Banana  - 3 3 3 4 5 
    -  (2) (4) (2) (3) (3) 
          
 Other  crops  -  30 38 30 34 30 
    -  (25) (33) (32) (28) (25) 
          
Livestock    31 23 18 26 27 30 
    (23) (21) (17) (25) (31) (32) 
          
 Poultry  - 4 7 9  10  11 
    -  (5)  (7)  (11) (14) (15) 
                       
 Other  livestock  -  18 10 16 16 17 
   -  (17) (10) (15) (17) (17) 
          
Figures in parentheses are percentage shares at constant prices.       
Source of basic data: National Statistical Coordination Board       
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Appendix Table A2: Consumer tax equivalent of import protection on agricultural inputs, Philippines, 1960 to 2004  
(percent) 
                                
    1960-64  1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
              
Fertilizers
a            
              
  Urea  49 55  -13  28  21  11  5 3 3 
              
 Ammophos  17  32  -9  54  19  15  12  3  3 
              
Pesticides
b  24  24 29 35 35 20 16  7  3 
              
Tractors
b            
              
  2  wheel  24  20 21 46 46 30 28 10  3 
              
  4  wheel  24  20 21 24 24 12 10 10  3 
              
Threshers
b  24  24 24 24 24 30 22 10  3 
              
Water pumps
b  46  46 46 46 46 30 24 10  3 
              
 
 
a Based on price comparison, i.e., the percentage difference between the ex-warehouse price and the CIF import 
unit value. 
 
b Based on book tariff rates. Implicit tariff from 1960-84 includes the import tariff and advance sales tax (10 
percent and 25 percent) mark-up respectively. The advance sales tax was abolished in 1986 and hence the 
implicit tariffs from 1985 onward includes only the tariff rate. 
  
Sources: Tariff Code of the Philippines (various issues) and Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority   
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Appendix Table A3: Trends in nominal rate of assistance to non-agricultural industries, Philippines, 
1967 to 2004 
        
















              
  All  non-agriculture    20 16 16 13  8  9  8  7 




industries    0 -3 1 2 4 7 0 0 
 
  Food  manufacturing    20  8 0 -3 3 7  16  21 
 
      Lightly processed    16  -1  -9  -7  1  7  19  28 
 
      Heavily processed     25  26  22  11  7  7  9  8 
 
  Other  manufacturing    29 31 33 26 13 12  6  3 
              
Source: Authors’ estimates 
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Appendix Table A4: Estimated effective protection rates for major economic sectors, Philippines, 1974 to 2004  
(percent) 
    Agriculture    Manufacturing    All  Sectors    
                
Tan, N. (1979)                 
                
 1974    9    44    36     
                  
Tan, E. (1994)                 
 1983    10    79    53     
 1985    9    74    49     
 1986    5    61    40     
 1988    5    56    36     
                  
Manasan and 
Pineda (1999)                 
 1990-94    26    32    29     
 1995-99    26    24    21     
 2000    24    19    18     
                  
Aldaba (2005)                 
 1998    19    7    9     
 1999    18    6    8     
 2000    16    6    7     
 2001    17    6    7     
 2002    14    5    6     
 2003    14    5    6     
 2004    15    5    6     
                
 
Sources: Tan (1979), Tan (1994), Medalla et al. (1995), Manasan and Pineda (1999), Aldaba (2005) 
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Appendix Table A5: Nominal rates of assistance to covered agricultural products, Philippines, 
1962 to 2004   
(percent) 
 Rice  Maize  Beef  Pigs  Chicken  Coconut  Banana  Sugar  All  covered 
1962  -18 -14  15  -30 -13 -24  0  38  -9 
1963  -6 8  15  -27 6  -25 0  -39  -4 
1964  14 8  15  -34  34  -25 0  -24  7 
1965  10 42  15  -23 49  -25  0  103  20 
1966  12 29  15  -4 48  -20  0  157  23 
1967  -5  39 15 10  66  -23  0  134  14 
1968 -14  44 15 44  80  -18  0  142  9 
1969 -10  38 15 40  92  -16  0 67  11 
1970  -8  -10 15 13  67  -28  -4 38  3 
1971  29  49 15 25  35  -27  -4 16  21 
1972  23 43  10  -10 25  -29 -4  -31  6 
1973  -39 -8  10  -18 -1  -23 -4  -48  -29 
1974  -53 -3  10  6 18  -19 -4  -34  -33 
1975  -29  6  10 -23  13  -21  -4 -44  -21 
1976  0  22  10 -12  5  -18  -4 -19  -4 
1977  -4 41  10  -9 42  -14 -4  14  2 
1978  -32 37  10  -15 42  -12 -4  24  -9 
1979 -24  16 10 31  38  -18  -4 16  -9 
1980  -38 25  5  48 48  -25 -4  -18  -19 
1981  -36 28  5  42 46  -21 -4  -15  -17 
1982 3 42  5  30 44  -31 -4  73  9 
1983  -10 -2  5  21 27  -36 -4  64  -5 
1984 0  7  5  39 26  -23 -4  193  7 
1985  43 41  5  59 50  -37 -4  273  21 
1986  26  62 20 32  40  -27  0  114  22 
1987  11  96 20 43  44  -17  0  126  22 
1988  -9  46 20 65  43  -14  0 70  6 
1989  2  54 20 56  37  -9  0 33  10 
1990  16  51 20 25  34  -17  0 29  12 
1991  1  24 30 24  39  -15  0 56  6 
1992  21  88 30 16  84  -19  0 75  21 
1993  46  69 30 24  68  -15  0 51  28 
1994  21  82 30 36  57  -10  0 35  19 
1995  55 94  30  -2 50 -9  0  80  36 
1996  71  48 30 31  37  -4  0 80  47 
1997  63  84 30 53  39  -22  0 60  45 
1998  21 66  30  -2 25 -5  0  95  20 
1999  53  100 20 23  60  2  0  171  41 
2000  73 96  10  6 66  -23  0  77  39 
2001  69 72  10  0 51  -23  0  67  36 
2002  54 45  10  -7 55 -5  0  105  27 
2003  41 25  10  -22 49 -8  0  84  15 
2004  17 35  10  -19 40  -11  0  64  7 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet. 
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Appendix Table A6: Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to 
exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural 
industries, Philippines, 1962 to 2004   
(percent) 
Total ag NRA 
Covered products 












1962  0  -9 -3 -8 -8 19 -23 
1963  0  -4 -1 -3 -3 19 -19 
1964  0  7 3 6 71 9 - 1 0  
1965 0  20  8  17 19 19 0 
1966 0  23  8  19 21 22 -1 
1967 0  14  5  12 13 20 -6 
1968  0  9 4 8 91 9- 9  
1969 0  11  4  10 10 21 -9 
1970  0  3 1 3 32 0 - 1 4  
1971 0  21  8  18 19 24 -4 
1972  0  6 2 5 51 5- 9  
1973  0  -29 -11 -25 -27 11 -35 
1974  0  -33 -12 -29 -31 10 -37 
1975 0  -21  -8  -18 -20 13 -29 
1976  0  -4 -1 -3 -3 17 -17 
1977  0  2 2 2 21 8 - 1 3  
1978  0  -9 -3 -7 -8 17 -21 
1979  0  -9 -2 -7 -8 17 -22 
1980 0  -19  -7  -16 -17 16 -29 
1981 0  -17  -6  -14 -15 13 -25 
1982  0  9 7 8 91 3- 3  
1983 0  -5  1  -4 -4 11 -14 
1984  0  7 7 7 81 2- 4  
1985  0  21 17 20 22 12 9 
1986  0  22 12 19 21 10 10 
1987  0  22 11 19 21 11 9 
1988  0  6 4 6 61 3- 6  
1989  0 10 5 9 1 090  
1990 0  12  7  11 12 11 1 
1991  0  6 3 6 69 - 3  
1992  0  21 10 19 20 11 9 
1993  0  28 13 25 27 9 17 
1994 0  19  8  17 18 10 8 
1995  0  36 15 32 34 7 26 
1996  0  47 19 41 44 8 33 
1997  0  45 20 39 42 9 31 
1998 0  20  8  17 19 8 10 
1999  0  41 18 36 39 11 25 
2000  0  39 17 34 37 9 25 
2001  0  36 15 32 34 8 24 
2002  0  27 11 24 26 7 18 
2003 0  15  6  14 15 5 10 
2004  0  7 3 6 633  
a NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
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Appendix Table A7: Value shares of primary production of covered and non-covered products,
a 
Philippines, 1962 to 2004   
(percent) 
  Rice Maize Sugar  Beef  Pigs Chicken Coconut Banana Covered 
Non-
covered 
1962  39 9 3 7  12  5  3  5  77 23 
1963  39  10 4 4  13  4 3 5 77 23 
1964  36 9 6 4  14  4 3 5 77 23 
1965  36 9 7 4  14  4 3 5 77 23 
1966  38 9 6 4  14  5 2 4 78 22 
1967  44 7 6 4  13  4 3 4 80 20 
1968  46 7 6 3  10  3 3 4 79 21 
1969  40 8  11 3 9  3 3 5 77 23 
1970  32 12 13  4 11  3 3 4 77 23 
1971  32 12 16  3 12  3 3 6 80 20 
1972  28 9  18 3  12  2 4 4 76 24 
1973  35 10 17  2  8  2 4 2 78 22 
1974  42 11 11  3  6  1 5 3 79 21 
1975  30 10 16  2  7  1 9 3 76 24 
1976  26 10 15  2  6  1 13 2 74 26 
1977  26 7  10 2 9  1 15 2 71 29 
1978  29 7 7 3 9  1 15 3 71 29 
1979  26 7 9 2 7  1 22 4 74 26 
1980  29 7  11 4 6  1 14 4 71 29 
1981  30 7  11 3 6  1 12 3 71 29 
1982  26 8 9 4 8  1 15 4 72 28 
1983  24 9 7 4 8  1 17 4 70 30 
1984  22 9 5 3  10  1 23 4 73 27 
1985  24  11 4 3 7  1 25 4 74 26 
1986  25  10 6 3  10  1 15 5 69 31 
1987  27 8 5 3  10  1 15 4 71 29 
1988  28 9 7 3 9  1 18 5 74 26 
1989  28 8 9 3  10  1 13 4 73 27 
1990  24 9 9 3  12  2 14 4 73 27 
1991  37 7 6 3  12  1 11 4 77 23 
1992  32 7 7 3  14  1 13 4 77 23 
1993  30 7 8 4  14  1 13 4 77 23 
1994  37 6 7 3  12  1 11 5 77 23 
1995  34 6 6 3  19  1 9 4 78 22 
1996  34 7 6 4  14  2 10 4 77 23 
1997  34 6 6 4  13  2 11 5 76 24 
1998  29 5 5 5  17  2 11 4 74 26 
1999  33 5 3 6  15  2 12 6 76 24 
2000  31 6 5 8  18  2 9 5 78 22 
2001  31 6 7 7  20  2 7 5 79 21 
2002  31 6 4 5  22  2 9 5 80 20 
2003  30 6 5 5  24  1 8 5 79 21 
2004  32 6 4 4  22  1 11 4 79 21 
 
a At farmgate undistorted prices. 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
 
   